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Supply Chain Security
EU Defending Food Chain Against Bio-Attack Print Email
Spring 2007
Written by Isabelle Bénoliel   

Isabelle BénolielSince 2002, there has been strong recognition worldwide of the existence of a genuine terrorist threat to the global food supply. However, this is not a new threat. There have been a number of deliberate attacks on food around the world over the years.

For example, in 1984, there was an attack on candies in Japan and another on salad bars in Oregon in the United States. In 2002, Chinese supplies of breakfast food were also targeted. Since 9/11, some evidence has been discovered in the Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan which indicates that they have studied the idea of using specific agents to contaminate food supplies.



The food chain is an easy and vulnerable target, and a terrorist attack on food could have devastating consequences. One needs only to look at the destructive impact that natural outbreaks can have. In 1985, milk pathogens affected around 170,000 people in the U.S., while in 1991 clam pathogens affected around 300,000 people in China. A deliberate attack could very quickly, very easily, affect an enormous amount of people and have a huge cost for the economy.

The European Union, like the U.S. Government, takes this threat very seriously. But when it comes to protection, difficulties arise from the sheer complexity of our food systems and the variety of ways in which it is produced and distributed.

There are two basic pillars to our approach. The first is prevention and preparedness, i.e. bringing together the various elements which can help in preventing an outbreak or averting a crisis. This means controlling food production and imports, monitoring the food chain (including distribution), and ensuring health preparedness. The second pillar is the response undertaken once an outbreak has occurred. In this situation, the first point of action is human health protection. How ever, the strategy also has to provide for public information and actions to coordinate responder networks and law enforcement agencies.

Animal health is clearly an area of high potential vulnerability, as deliberate attempts can be made to introduce diseases into animal populations. The malicious introduction of a virus or contaminant in an animal could spark an international crisis by creating a major animal disease epidemic and/or a food safety problem. In such a scenario, the same defense mechanisms apply to a deliberate introduction of disease as to a conventional (i.e. accidental or natural) one. These mechanisms are early detection, the use of traceability systems, rapid control-and-eradication measures, contingency plans and overall coordination. A comprehensive and effective general safety system is an essential precursor to preparing for and responding to agro-terrorist attacks.

Any deliberate introduction of a disease would throw up complex risks and challenges. For example, a virus or an agent could be introduced in a number of locations, amplifying the impact. The challenge, therefore, is to prevent such a deliberate introduction and, if it occurs, to take swift and effective action to minimize the impact.

The European Commission and member states already have extensive experience in dealing with animal disease crises. There has been BSE or “mad cow disease,” foot-and-mouth disease and avian influenza, all of which prompted stricter controls and tighter mechanisms for the identification of animals and their movement.

The identification of animals is clearly, at this stage, a very valuable tool. In Europe, every cow, goat and sheep is identified through an ear-tag or a microchip. If there were to be an outbreak —deliberate or natural—this would prove crucial in isolating the farm and susceptible or affected animals. It would also help with the rapid eradication of the disease and the halt of its spread.

Another important tool is the control of imported animal products. A comprehensive system to minimize the risk of illegal imports of animal products has already been put in place. The legislative framework includes approval of third-country establishments, a system of certification for imports and mandatory checks at border inspection posts. Controls are also carried out by our Food and Veterinary Office. These measures ensure that our controls on imports are as tough as domestic controls.

On the basis of previous outbreaks, a large body of food safety laws was developed, which outlines the provisions in place to protect the entire food chain. These rules date back to 2002 and comprise of three main elements. Firstly, there is the general obligation for food operators to take all necessary measures to ensure that their products are safe for consumption. Secondly, there are legislative provisions for controls on food and feed by the border authorities. Finally, emergency measures, to be taken in case of a food safety threat, are laid out, and a rapid-alert system for food and feed has been established.

An important aspect of the 2002 legislation on general food safety is the distinction between risk assessment and risk management. Risk assessment—scientific and technical advice, scientific studies, etc.—is now carried out by the European Food Safety Authority (an agency partly comparable to the Food and Drug Administration in the U.S.), which is based in Parma, Italy. It is on the basis of this risk assessment that the European Commission takes political responsibility for the risk management. This distinction has proved crucial in ensuring that any actions taken in the event of a crisis are scientifically based, in addition to being politically responsible and legitimate.

Another element which is very important for both the food industry and consumers is traceability. It is obligatory for producers to withdraw unsafe food from the market and to provide accurate information to consumers. In order for them to be able to do this, there are provisions to ensure that the origin of farm animals, feed, ingredients and all food sources are known. Producers must be able to identify where and from whom they have received food or raw materials, as well as to whom they will sell or provide the product. This requirement relies on the “one step back, one step forward” approach. The same requirements apply to imports. Through this mechanism full traceability for every single animal food product on the market is ensured. As for fruit and vegetables, the traceability mechanism is established through labeling of the country of origin and producer. Usually these products are packaged on the site of production and they remain packed until their final distribution to consumers. It is therefore quite easy to trace back the origin of fruits and vegetables.

The situation is more difficult for goods which are sold in bulk - for example, cereals or sugar - because they are traced by batches and products are often mixed. In this case, there are some weaknesses and there might therefore be an increased risk.

Food systems are very complex—and so are the agents of potential harm. They include germs, toxins, chemicals and heavy metals that can be deliberately used to contaminate food sources. This contamination can be done on the farm, during feed- and food-processing, storage and transportation, in retail establishments or even in restaurants during food preparation. There are risks at every stage.

Once an outbreak or a crisis occurs, or when an attack has taken place, what should be done? The EU is a border-free space of 27 countries, throughout which materials, products, services and people can circulate freely.

It is crucial that mechanisms and arrangements are in place in the human health sector in case of an attack. Tracing the source of a deliberate release of a contaminant requires a multi-sector approach, which combines human and environmental epidemiological action with information from security services on an EU-wide scale.

In the aftermath of 2001, a health security committee was created within the EU, establishing a program of cooperation and preparedness in response to biological and chemical agent attacks. This committee aims at improving preparedness and response. A series of actions have been undertaken with focused objectives: to have a mechanism for information exchange and coordination, and to ensure EU-wide capability for detection, identification and surveillance of agents in laboratories.

Stocks of medicines are also being created at national level, but with an exchange of data between national health services (abiding by EU rules and guidance) and keeping links with third countries and international organizations.

The EU now has up to eleven rapid alert systems which were put in place in order to connect national systems in several sectors. Three of these rapid-alert systems are of particular interest here. The first is the rapid-alert system for food and feed that can transmit immediate information throughout the Union in cases where a particular food poses a risk to human health. Any member state that detects a pathogen in food sends this information to the European Commission, which circulates it to the 27 member states. On the basis of this information, an immediate decision to withdraw the product can be taken and the product can be removed from the market wherever necessary across the entire Union. This has proven to be a very efficient and useful tool.

The second system is a secure 24 hour/7 day-a-week rapid alert system for biological and chemical agent attacks (RAS-BICHAT). Established alongside the Health Security Committee, it ensures that there is a permanent contact point in the field of health within each member-state, which can be used in the event of a chemical attack.

The third system, and the newest mechanism, was created upon the request of the EU Heads of State and Government, following the Madrid and London bombings. It is a communication network which connects all of the services of the European Commission. This mechanism is called ARGUS and it applies to any sort of crisis, whether natural disasters (such as pollution threats) or terrorist attacks. In addition to linking up the Commission’s departments, ARGUS can connect to the relevant services of the member states. It also is a coordination tool which could draft and recommend decisions to be taken by our political authorities if necessary. That way, in the event of a crisis, immediate action would be taken at Commission level, political level and then at member state level.

At international level the Global Health Security Initiative was launched immediately after 9/11 by the G7-Plus. This group has continued to meet both at ministry level and at technical level. The Global Health Security Initiative is focussed on concerted global action to strengthen the public health response to an international biological, chemical or nuclear terrorism threat. Such an initiative is crucial for the exchange of information and for sharing knowledge and experience.

The EU has a well developed body of rules for crisis preparedness and response, and a contingency plan of action for both public health and business continuity. The main differences between a terrorist attack and an accidental event would be the dimensions of the initial phase and the number of primary outbreaks. But however the crisis begins, a sound and comprehensive food safety system is essential in order to effectively protect our citizens. The values and systems that were established in order to ensure safety throughout the whole food chain have functioned well so far, and continue to do so. They will be the cornerstone of further anti-terrorism measures that the EU intends to build.

Nevertheless, given that the Commission's goal is to have a comprehensive approach to biodefense, there is a need to go further than what has already been done or what is already planned for implementation. A consultation of European stakeholders will therefore be undertaken through a Green Paper on Bio-Preparedness and Food Defense, which should be published in spring 2007. The aim of the Commission Green Paper will be to stimulate a debate and launch a process of consultation at European level on how to reduce biological risks and enhance preparedness. The Commission expects that it will receive concrete feedback and ideas from stakeholders throughout Europe and even worldwide.

It is also the European Commission's aim to increase international cooperation on biodefense. Strengthening and increasing convergence would be the key words in our cooperation with third countries such as the United States—to share views, to share ideas, to share experience and to be as well prepared as possible on both sides of the Atlantic.

 
EU-U.S. Aviation and Maritime Transportation Issues: Markets, Safety, Security and Environment Print Email
Roundtables
02/25/09

The Roundtable featured members of the European Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism who presented an overview of their priorities, including: the negotiations of the second stage of the EU-U.S. Aviation Agreement; the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme; air traffic management; the EU-U.S. agreement on aviation safety; and aviation and maritime security, including container scanning.  Members of the Committee’s delegation included: The Honorable Paolo Costa, Chairman of the Committee, The Honorable Georg Jarzembowski, and The Honorable Saïd El KhadraouiThe Honorable Jonathan Evans, Chairman of the European Parliament’s Delegation to the United States was also present and underlined the importance of continued EU-U.S. cooperation on transport issues.  The United States perspective was represented by Lynne Pickard, Deputy Director of the Office of Environment and Energy at the Federal Aviation Administration, who outlined the U.S. policy regarding aviation emissions, and Michael Scardaville, Acting Director of European and Multilateral Affairs at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, who addressed U.S. aviation security issues, in particular, the 100% container scanning initiative.

 
Food Labeling: Lessons Learned Print Email
Summer/Fall 2007
Written by Jane Earley   

Now that the United States has begun to experience the kinds of food scares that rocked Europe several years ago, more American consumers are starting to worry about the efficacy of the food-safety system that is supposed to protect them. Some people fear negligent or criminal adulteration of imported food products such as pet food from China; others worry about problems at home, citing the example of an American company that recently had to recall batches of its brand of peanut butter after they were tied to salmonella outbreaks that sickened more than 400 people in 44 U.S. states. Fears and doubts are even growing among some regulators.

In these circumstances, could Europe’s food-safety solutions offer some useful approaches for the United States?


Certainly, the U.S. system seems to need fixing. Former Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Associate Commissioner William Hubbard was quoted in a recent New York Times article saying that “the public thinks the food supply is much more protected than it is;” former Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Tommy Thompson’s concerns about threats to the food supply are something that he says he worries about “every single night.” A food marketing-institute survey recently reported survey results showing that the number of consumers “completely” or “somewhat confident” in the safety of supermarket food declined from 82 percent in 2006 to – in a single year – 66 percent, the lowest point since 1989. That was the year when the issues of pesticides in apples and contaminated grapes were widely reported. Aggravating the uncertainties is the fact, tucked into the trade-deficit figures since 2005, that the United States has become a net food-importer for the first time in its history.

The problems are both with private providers and public regulators. In the wake of last year’s U.S. scare about E. coli-contaminated spinach from California and now in the context of the Chinese episodes (involving pet food, melamine, monkfish and toxic toothpaste), FDA’s performance and resources have been widely criticized. More funding for food-safety inspection programs by FDA has been requested in legislative proposals that have wide political support. Some food-producers, particularly those involved with fresh-cut produce, have requested mandatory federal regulations. Amidst these criticisms, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has added food safety to its “high risk” program areas. The Government Accountability Office defines these as activities that need increased visibility, urgent attention and transformation to serve the needs of the public.

Genetically-modified foods are not at the moment in the spotlight, although the U.S. export system is leaky, and there are widespread feelings that U.S. shipments with genetic modifications continue to evade the scrutiny of regulators and arrive unapproved in destination countries.

One proposal to improve the U.S. approach to food safety is to give the FDA authority for mandatory product recalls – a longstanding issue in Congress. Another effective reform would be to consolidate the food-safety oversight into one agency (rather than the current twelve). A further reform would require companies exporting to the United States to obtain certification demonstrating that their products meet standards for food safety and consumer protection. This would presumably be additional to the registration now required of importers for reasons of food security.

FDA has responded to some of these developments. An Assistant FDA Commissioner for Food Protection has been appointed to develop a comprehensive strategy for protecting the safety of both domestically-produced and imported food, and to enhance FDA’s authority to intervene effectively and respond to food adulteration instances. FDA has also committed to implement a pilot data-mining program to identify and inspect up to 10 importers who bring in large quantities of high-risk foods into the U.S. and to conduct 5600 domestic and 100 foreign inspections of high risk firms. There has also been extensive consultation with Chinese authorities on the issues of food safety raised by adulterated products for animal and human consumption, including on mandatory registration of Chinese firms that intend to export food and feed products to the U.S.

Other approaches to food safety are also gaining attention. Country-of-origin labeling, now mandatory for fish and about to be required for meat and produce, continues to be a hot topic in the trade press and in legislative debate. Originally intended to influence consumers to favor domestic production, country of origin labeling (COOL) has also become a way for some consumers to identify products that may pose a food safety risk or consume large amounts of energy in transport.

Labels showing “food miles” for energy-conservation purposes are not under active official consideration at this time. But the concept has received much attention in the press and in the organic context. In fact, farmers markets have long been a cornerstone of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s efforts to encourage direct marketing to urban populations. These have grown in number by 18 percent since 2004. Additionally, new initiatives seek to link producers and restaurants at a local level. Recent food literature also highlights the desirability of sourcing local produce – although it is obviously foolish to imagine that modern communities can depend entirely on locally produced food.

In the private sector, as consumers nationwide start to focus on sourcing more of their food locally, parts of the food industry are starting to discuss energy use as a factor in distribution. Many corporate groups would like to see increased use of certification and labeling for other purposes (sustainability), accompanied by changes in food utilization (local purchasing) and reduced carbon output (food miles). Both companies and non-government organizations have become active on these and a related constellation of branding issues revolving around food origins. Food companies are increasingly concerned to deliver to consumers not just safe foods but foods that also reflect the company’s activism in responding to values cherished by consumers, such as environmental impact. Coca-Cola has committed to overhaul how it uses water throughout its operations and bottling franchises in a drive for greater environmental sustainability. Wal-Mart is engaged in an effort to make itself a driving force promoting sustainable production globally. Most notably, organic sales have jumped considerably in the wake of the food scares, and other labels are gaining currency. Consumers often feel that organic labels provide a measure of safety, although they would be hard pressed to describe why that is the case in any context other than possibly lower pesticide residues.

So how does Europe stack up in comparison on these issues? Looking at the European response to the “mad cow disease” crisis and other food-safety scares, it sometimes seems legitimate to ask whether Europe has solved its food-safety problems or whether it is creating them. Certainly, the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) – created by the European Parliament in 2002 – has begun to establish itself as a firm foundation of technical expertise and confidence in the eyes of EU food consumers. Since its creation, it has engaged in work on maximum residue levels of pesticides, plant pest risk analysis, nutrition and health claims. Its recent agenda has included work on nanotechnology and marine biotoxins.

The agency is engaged in an extensive study of the effects and use of irradiation to protect food from decay. Europe has lagged in use of this technique of controlled radiation (only 10 member states have approved facilities to process irradiated foods), but it is embarking on intensive work on nutrition and health claims for the procedure. EFSA has also started outreach to civil society groups and the scientific community, making the agency a paragon of transparency compared to previous food-safety programs in Europe.

However effective EFSA has been in its assigned role as scientific advisor to the Commission, the fact remains that it is neither part of the Commission nor answerable to it. And its views do not have to be taken up in member state regulation. Take this example of the limits on its authority: despite EFSA statements, poor consumer opinion of genetically-modified food has continued to block member-state approval and retail use of most products containing or made with genetically-modified organisms (GMO). EFSA has made only limited progress in other contentious areas.

As part of the Commission’s efforts on labeling, it is also undertaking to quantify the costs to the food industry of revising the general regime on food-labeling and nutritional-labeling. And, while tackling issues with China on food-safety problems, the Commission has again found its efforts focused largely on GM issues.

So far, there has been more heat than light generated by this transatlantic issue. Americans often are quick to lecture European regulators about their reluctance to approve genetically-modified (GM) foods. Many Americans who have eaten foods with GM content for years with no apparent ill effects are somewhat bemused by the hostility that they engender in Europe. But European consumers continue to resist. Critics wonder: Are European consumers averse to science-based food regulation? That is unclear.

A test may come with the new European “regulation on organics” that allows a “tolerance” of 0.9 percent for genetically-modified content accidentally introduced into organic foods. The organics regulation follows on a widely debated earlier regulation on GM-labeling in Europe. This decree requires that all food labels must report it when a food contains more than miniscule amounts of genetically modified material. But miniscule amounts can be expected in many agricultural crops: genetically modified plants now are planted on many farms and crops planted near these crops can be expected to have them. These tiny amounts, not enough to pose a problem, are called a “tolerance.” Should organic foods be treated differently? European regulators believe they should not. So the issue is whether consumers will be tolerant of the tolerance.

It is a truly vexed issue. For example, the Commission has recently informed European consumers that there is no way to avoid genetically-modified content even in the organic area, the last refuge from the tide of genetically-modified agricultural products that threatens to overrun the global food supply. Although the organic label was generally welcomed, the Commission’s decision to include a GM-content threshold in the organic foods regulation sparked fervent debate and has been met with hostility from much of the environmental community.

Environmental and consumer groups decry the newly-tolerated threshold of GM content in organic food, despite the Commission’s declaration that an attempt to reach “zero tolerance” is simply not realistic. Many consumers, who turned to organic foods because of their connoted health benefits, are disenchanted by the tolerance of any GM content, because of the fears – at least some of which seem to be more myths than science-based facts – surrounding GMO’s unhealthiness. The organic farming community is also loath to be required to tolerate genetically-modified elements, seen as contradictory to the organic motto “pure and free from.”

Moreover, there are suspicions, reflected in news articles, that this tolerance is the "thin end of a wedge which will allow the creeping contamination of organic food across Europe" with higher and higher tolerated levels of GMO in food. It is an understatement to say that anti-GM activists are concerned. But this debate over the "creeping contamination" of GMOs into European organic food seems premature. In fact, the European Parliament in April confirmed that higher tolerance levels were out of the question. Still, it remains to be seen whether European consumers will prove more open-minded about questions involving GMOs in the light of opinions and findings from EFSA and other agencies.

Meanwhile, European consumers have enjoyed a retail sector which has been extremely active in promoting values cherished by their clientele, such as food safety and environmental protection. For example, Eurepgap, a retail-buying consortium certifying a broad spectrum of agricultural produce, places significant importance on health and safety requirements, laying out specific rules for farmers to follow for certification. Another example can be seen in Tesco’s – a UK-based global grocery chain – commitment to carbon neutrality and its “food miles” label for air-freighted produce. European consumers have a choice when it comes to shopping in accordance with their values.

For the moment, it is difficult to find useful U.S.-EU comparisons – at least in the form of “best practice” rules – between food safety systems and regulatory responses to consumer pressure on opposite sides of the Atlantic. This is true in both the public and the private sector. With strengths and weaknesses on both sides, there is a clear agreement on a least a central theme: the need for effectiveness, transparency and responsiveness to consumers. An important step in implementing this approach involves helping consumers define their real needs.

Jane Earley is an attorney who consults in the international trade, environment, food and fishery sectors. She is currently affiliated with the World Wildlife Fund.

 
Transatlantic Cooperation on Supply Chain Security Print Email
Roundtables
03/07/07

The Hon. László Kovács, Commissioner for Taxation and Customs Union, and Robert Verrue, Director General for Taxation and Customs Union at the European Commission, reviewed current initiatives in supply chain security, the effects on international trade and the prospects for transatlantic cooperation. The bill proposed by the U.S. Congress requiring the scanning of 100% of containers entering U.S. ports became the focus of the discussion. Referring to the technical difficulty of this task, its negative impact on commerce, as well as on transatlantic relations, participants concurred that 100% scanning was neither practical nor cost-efficient given the available technology and the volume of shipments to the U.S. Commissioner Kovacs concluded that mutual recognition and bilateral cooperation is needed in addressing these critical security issues. The involvement of the private sector was also a key to developing a sound container security agreement. Participants included Mandy Bowers, Professional Staff Member, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives; and Peter Verga, Principal Deputy, Homeland Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense, who offered the U.S. perspective. Evelyn Suarez, a partner at the law firm of Williams Mullen moderated the meeting.