There were such bitter divisions in the first place. Iraq may have ignited the blowout, but differences on that issue alone do not explain the emotional or broad-based nature of Transatlantic recrimination and bitterness. That is because much of the debate both within and between Europe and America has been less about Iraq itself and more about what the Bush administration’s approach to Iraq may say about the future behavior of the world’s only superpower. And in this debate, personalities, policies, catalytic events, and deeper structural changes of world politics all play a role.
There has been no lack of personalities grating on each other like chalk on a blackboard. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s steady stream of gratuitous public insults of European allies needlessly alienated broad segments of European opinion at a time when Washington was seeking support from European capitals for its policies. President Bush’s regular invocation of providential blessing, coupled with his self-righteous, finger-jabbing, “with us or against us” rhetoric, diverted foreign friends from concern about Baghdad to concern about Washington.
Europe, of course, has no shortage of quirky personalities. French President Jacques Chirac, having won a second term with a comfortable majority, has shifted into a phase of “hyper-Gaullism” that appears bent on moving beyond mere criticism of America to a true strategy of containment. Mr. Chirac has found an ally in German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who eked out reelection by cynically courting pacifists and East German communists at the expense of a half century of friendship with the United States.
Without Mr. Schröder, Chirac would have remained a somewhat lonely voice. But Mr. Schröder abandoned Germany’s traditional role of mediating between Paris and Washington and tied German fortunes to Gallic ambition. This shift in Germany’s position then made it easier for President Vladimir Putin of Russia to join a new axis of dissent less focused on blocking Saddam Hussein than on containing President Bush.
But highlighting the perhaps less-than-noble motives of French or German leaders does not explain U.S. failure to isolate them, why the United States could not get a majority in the UN Security Council for a second resolution on Iraq, or why the United States itself is so isolated today. The Bush administration simply did not make the case for preemptive military intervention on its particular timetable.
Washington not only failed to persuade Russia, it failed to persuade or bribe another critical ally, Turkey, and even failed to persuade, bribe or bully six undecided Security Council members into voting for the resolution.
These failures, however, do not excuse the hollow posturing of many European nations. Those who argued that imminent war was not the answer were obliged to set forth an alternative plan for truly coercive inspections, backed by the United Nations. Such a plan could have involved more capable inspectors supported by troops on the ground, extended “no-ßy” and “no-drive” zones, the ability to destroy facilities being sanitized or capabilities being moved – a whole variety of intermediate options short of preemptive war yet offering a tough, focused way for the United Nations to disarm Iraq.
Although the Bush administration rejected out of hand some efforts in this vein, neither the Germans nor the French chose to set forth such proposals in serious detail. And when the French declared that they would veto any second resolution, even if there was a Security Council majority for it, the game was over.
Policy differences over a host of other issues beyond Iraq have exacerbated matters. European concerns have been fueled by the Bush administration’s refusal to participate in international agreements ranging from the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol on climate change to a worldwide ban on antipersonnel land mines, a global treaty to protect bio-diversity, a verification mechanism for the Biological Weapons Control Treaty, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Europeans are critical of the Bush administration’s treatment of suspected terrorist fighters being held at Guantanamo Bay naval station in Cuba, its pullout from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, its neglect of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and its embrace of preemptive military action as a foreign policy doctrine.
Americans often retort that their European friends seem eager to lecture Americans about U.S. failings but unwilling to spend the money necessary to make European troops effective, are too absorbed with the details of deeper and wider European integration to recognize the dangers posed by terrorists wielding weapons of mass destruction, are eager to trumpet their “noble” multilateralist instincts in contrast to America’s “base” unilateralism (except when it comes to international rules that do not support EU preferences), and have failed to advance economic reforms that could sustain European prosperity or anchor world growth in the New Economy. Some, such as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, accuse Europeans of using antagonism towards the United States as a way of defining their own identity.
These quarrels on international issues are exacerbated by a series of Transatlantic spats over such traditionally domestic issues as food safety, the death penalty, data privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and a range of other civil liberties.
In and of themselves, such squabbles are also nothing new. But increasingly, these disputes are being viewed through different foreign policy lenses, each framed by a separate catalytic event. For most Europeans the catalytic event framing much of their foreign and security policy remains the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 and the ensuing collapse of the Soviet Union and European communism.
When the people on the streets of Central and Eastern Europe brought down the Iron Curtain with their collective cry, “We want to return to Europe,” they unleashed an earthquake that is still shaking the continent and its institutions. It has given Europeans an historic opportunity to build a continent that is truly whole, free and at peace with itself. It is a goal that Americans share. But it continues to absorb, almost overwhelm European energy and attention.
For most Americans, November 9 also played a catalytic role, and informed much of U.S. foreign policy in the ensuing decade. But in American public consciousness the horrific events of September 11, 2001 have transformed November 9, 1989 into a bookend to an era of transition to a new and newly dangerous century. September 11 has unleashed a very fundamental debate about the nature and purpose of America’s role in the world.
In many ways, the current debate is analogous to the period of the late 1940s, when America had won a war but not defined its postwar role. In that period, the notion of containment emerged as an organizing principle for American foreign policy. In many ways, the events of November 9, 1989 represented the logical conclusion to that policy. Today, the debate is how the threat of terrorism, joined to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, should lead the United States to reframe its foreign and security policy.
In such an open debate, some basic propositions – mainstays of U.S. foreign policy for 60 years – are being reexamined. And here some differences with the containment debate of the late 1940s are instructive for Transatlantic relations. Then, Americans believed that one part of Europe was the front line and another part of Europe posed grave dangers. As a consequence, the core of U.S. foreign policy was rooted in European stability. Today, Americans believe they themselves are on the front line, and the danger emanates from beyond Europe. Europe, as a consequence, having already been won, is seen increasingly by some in the Bush administration more as a platform than a partner in its new global campaign.
All these factors feed into structural dynamics that are now shaping relations between Europe and the United States. Taken together, November 9 and September 11 convey a single message: the future health of Transatlantic relations will be defined less by the degree of U.S. engagement in Europe and more by the ability of the United States and Europe to cope with the promises and dangers of globalization.
The greatest security threats to the United States and Europe today stem from problems that defy borders: terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, pandemics and environmental scarcities. They stem from challenges that have traditionally been marginal but contentious in the Transatlantic security dialogue: peacekeeping outside the traditional NATO area; post-conßict reconstruction and rehabilitation; rogue states, failed states and states hijacked by groups or networks. And they come from places, such as Africa and Southwest and Central Asia, that the Transatlantic agenda has often ignored.
Few great goals in this world can be achieved without America. But America can achieve few of them alone. In this era of shadowy networks and bio-terrorists, failed states and recession, the only way we can share our burdens, extend our inßuence, and achieve our goals will often be by banding together with others, particularly our core allies. We cannot handle the world entirely on our own, making every problem our problem and then sending our warriors to conduct our foreign policy.
U.S. military capabilities are vast. But fire power is not staying power. We can win wars without allies, but we can only secure peace with allies. It is decidedly in American interests to seek a more effective global partnership with a Europe that can act in real-time on pressing international matters. We must develop ways to work better together in fast-breaking crises; manage our differences before they impair our ability to cooperate; and improve joint efforts to address emerging threats and global issues.
Are we ready for such a partnership? Will Americans have either the patience or the inclination, and will Europeans have either the capacity or the will, to generate the coherence of action that will be required? These are open questions that will test leadership on both sides of the Atlantic. Our most immediate task, of course, is reaching agreement on the role of the international community in Iraq. This certainly will be difficult and contentious. But we must also frame our continuing debate over Iraq with a wider perspective if we are to pick up the pieces of our broader relationship.
We should start with three other areas of endeavor. The first is to generate a new understanding of strategic stability. During the Cold War the two superpowers preserved stability despite their animosity because they felt equally at risk. They shared the view that the prospect of suicide would deter anyone from actually using weapons of mass destruction, and they were willing to negotiate certain rules of the road together and with other nations. Today, all three of these premises have vanished. Other nuclear powers have emerged – and their rules of the road are unclear. Terrorists are not detered by suicide, and they are not at the negotiating table. They have nothing to protect and nothing to lose. In short, Cold War deterrence will not work as it once did, and in some cases it will not work at all.
A new conception of strategic stability must weave what have been separate strands – the fight against terrorism, nuclear force posture, non-proliferation and defense efforts – into a comprehensive defense against weapons of mass destruction, as former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn has suggested. These strands must be considered jointly, and discussion of the Bush administration’s doctrine of preemption should be incorporated into a broader discussion of what is likely to constitute security and stability in the new century.
A second, related initiative should be to develop “Transatlantic” approaches to homeland security and societal protection. When the United States was attacked, our allies immediately invoked the North Atlantic Treaty’s mutual defense clause, in essence stating that the September 11 attack was an attack on a common security space – a common “homeland.” It is unlikely that a successful effort to strengthen homeland security can be conducted in isolation from one’s allies.
A terrorist WMD attack on Europe would immediately affect American civilians, American forces, and American interests. If such an attack involved contagious disease, it could threaten the American homeland itself in a matter of hours. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, it has also become very clear that controling borders, operating ports, or managing airports and train stations in the age of globalization involves a delicate balance of identifying and intercepting weapons and terrorists without excessively hindering the trade, legal migration, travel and tourism upon which European and American prosperity increasingly depends.
How should we work together across the Atlantic on homeland defense in its many components? The challenges Americans are encountering in crafting effective homeland security responses – due to the broad nature of the threat, the multiplicity of actors, and overlapping federal and state competencies – are even more daunting across the Atlantic, given Europe’s multi-jurisdictional setting. European preparedness efforts are not only of immediate relevance for the safety of millions of people, they have a direct impact on NATO’s mission and on the anti-terrorism campaign.
They will also inßuence U.S.-EU relations and bilateral ties to individual countries, have important consequences for Transatlantic economic relations and intelligence cooperation, raise prospects for new avenues of cooperation with Russia, and could provide important comparisons for U.S. homeland security programs.
European experience can also be useful for Americans because the countries involved are liberal democracies that, like the United States, are faced with the problems of how to balance law enforcement and civil liberties and how to define the proper role of the armed forces in societal protection at home. Finally, efforts to protect the U.S. homeland against cyber-attacks can hardly be conducted in isolation from key allies whose economies and information networks are so intertwined with ours.
A third initiative should be to develop new models of Transatlantic governance. It is fashionable to suggest that Europeans and Americans are drifting apart, no longer engaged with each other, as during the Cold War. Yet nothing could be farther from the truth. Almost every single indicator of societal interaction – whether it be ßows of money, services, investments, people or ideas – underscores a startling fact: our societies are not drifting, they are colliding. The decade of the 1990s – the decade when the supposed “glue” of the Cold War dissolved – was one of the most intense periods of Transatlantic integration in history. The advance of globalization is fastest and deepest between the continents of Europe and North America.
Among the nations of the European Union, the policies of European integration reach so deep that it is common to hear that European policies have become domestic policies, and that EU countries have entered a new realm of “European domestic policy.” This is very true, but it does not begin to capture the real dynamic of what is happening. A similar, if largely unnoticed, process has been underway for some time across the Atlantic. Our economies and societies have become so intertwined that in a number of specific areas Europeans and Americans have transcended “foreign” relations.
We have moved into a new arena of “Transatlantic domestic policy” – a new frontier in which specific social and economic concerns and transnational actors often jump formal borders, override national policies, and challenge traditional forms of governance throughout the Atlantic world. The networks of interdependence being created across the Atlantic have become so dense, in fact, that they have attained a quality far different than those either continent has with any other. We have only begun to understand the many dimensions of this phenomenon.
Many of the issues confronting European and American policy makers today are those of “deep integration,” a new closeness that strikes at core issues of domestic governance, and that is of a qualitatively different nature from the “shallow integration” model of the Bretton Woods-GATT system established at the end of World War II. Deep integration is generating new Transatlantic networks and new connections. But because it reaches into traditionally domestic areas it can also generate social dislocation, anxiety and friction, as on such issues as food safety, competition policies, religious cults, privacy protection or the death penalty. Such conßicts are unlikely to endanger the relationship, and are more a symptom that our societies are interacting so closely that many issues are debated as quasi-domestic controversies.
Such controversies less often reßect differences in values than different perspectives on what tradeoffs are politically or socially acceptable when these values collide with each other. On many of these issues, in fact, differences within the United States and within Europe are more serious than those between Americans and Europeans. At the same time, European and American scientists and entrepreneurs are pushing the frontiers of human discovery in such fields as genetics, nanotechnology and electronic commerce where there are neither global rules nor Transatlantic mechanisms to sort out the complex legal, ethical and commercial tradeoffs posed by such innovation.
Neither the framework for our relationship nor the way our governments are currently organized adequately captures these new realities. There is a growing mismatch between how leaders and specialists are trained and organized to manage Transatlantic affairs, and what skills will be required to meet 21st century challenges. Opinion shapers need to look more closely at the intersection between deep Atlantic integration and traditional areas of domestic regulation.
There is considerable need to work more concertedly to identify “best practices” for governance that could improve coordination and create safety valves for political and social pressures resulting from deep integration. In democratic societies controversial domestic issues are decided by elections or court rulings. Across the Atlantic such quasi-domestic issues need to be managed through new forms of Transatlantic regulatory and parliamentary consultation and coordination and more innovative diplomacy that takes account of the growing role of private actors.
Iraq has been a loud wake-up call to the Transatlantic partnership. The question facing us is whether we can respond to this tragedy by assuming the global obligations our partnership demands – for history will ultimately judge us not only in terms of how well or badly we managed a particular crisis, but also how well we used such crises to shape our relationship for the future.
Daniel S. Hamilton is the Richard von WeizsŠcker Professor and Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and Executive Director of the American Consortium on EU Studies, the EU Center in Washington, DC. He previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and as Associate Director of the U.S. State Department's Policy Planning Staff.
This article was published in European Affairs: Volume number IV, Issue number II in the Spring of 2003.